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Affective Polarization in Multiparty 
Systems? Comparing Affective Polarization 
Towards Voters and Parties in Norway and 
the United States
Erik Knudsen*
A growing body of comparative studies on partisan hostility – a phenomenon known as affec-
tive polarization – is providing evidence that partisan affective polarization is generally no 
greater in the United States than it is in many European multiparty systems. This article takes 
the comparative literature on affective polarization one step further by presenting the first 
comparative study on affective polarization that simultaneously uses, compares and combines 
a direct measure of affective polarization towards voters (using the inter-party marriage meas-
ure) and an indirect measure of affective polarization towards parties (using the like/dislike of 
party measure) while accounting for the fact that multiparty systems have numerous political 
parties. This is done by comparing the levels of affective polarization in the United States and 
Norway. The results show greater affective polarization in the United States relating to parties, 
but the differences between these two countries are indistinguishable from chance when focus-
ing on the affect relating to voters. This provides empirical evidence that comparative evidence 
of negative affect towards parties cannot necessarily be generalized to suggest that there is 
comparative evidence of negative affect towards voters. Yet the results also suggest that nega-
tive feelings towards out-parties move to some extent to the personal level in terms of negative 
feelings towards voters of these out-parties.
Introduction
Are Americans more hostile across party lines than Europeans in countries 
with multiparty systems? A large body of literature has established that 
Americans are affectively polarized along partisan lines – that is, they dis-
like voters of the other party and view their co-partisans positively (Iyengar 
& Westwood 2015; Iyengar et al. 2019). This focus on the United States has 
led scholars (e.g., Gidron et al. 2019; Iyengar et al. 2019) to call for more 
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comparative studies on affective polarization. Consequently, a growing body 
of literature is providing comparative evidence of affective polarization sug-
gesting that the US situation is not unique (Carlin & Love 2016; Hansen & 
Kosiara-Pedersen 2017; Huddy et al. 2018; Lauka et al. 2018; Westwood et al. 
2018; Gidron et al. 2019; Reiljan 2020; Wagner 2020).
This article addresses a key limitation in the comparative literature on 
affective polarization. Studies have either mainly focused on measures of 
affective polarization towards parties, rather than using more direct mea-
sures of affective polarization towards voters, or have not accounted for 
the fact that multiparty systems have several (i.e., not only two or a few) 
major parties in parliament. On the one hand, studies that have included 
several parties in multiparty systems, yet have relied on measures of affect 
towards parties, have not directly addressed polarization as a manifestation 
of social identity (Wagner 2020). Thus, they cannot necessarily speak to 
comparative differences in levels of affective polarization towards voters 
(Druckman & Levendusky 2019). On the other hand, comparative studies 
that have focused on affect towards voters have not accounted for the fact 
that multiparty systems have more than two major parties in parliament 
(Iyengar et al. 2012). As affective polarization towards two major parties 
may not reflect the level of affective polarization towards all parties in par-
liament, such studies may have underestimated the measured level of affec-
tive polarization in multiparty systems.
Largely missing from the literature is comparative evidence of the extent 
to which negative feelings towards parties move to the personal level and 
translate to negative feelings towards those who vote for those parties. To 
address the aforementioned gaps, I contribute the first comparative study 
on affective polarization that simultaneously uses, compares and combines 
a measure of affective polarization towards voters (the so-called inter-party 
marriage measure) and a measure of affective polarization towards parties 
(the so-called like/dislike of party measure) while accounting for the fact 
that multiparty systems have numerous political parties. I do this by com-
paring the levels of affective polarization in the United States and Norway.
Partisan Affective Polarization
This study builds on research on affective polarization that views partisan-
ship as a social identity (e.g., Iyengar et al. 2019). Social identity involves a 
subjective sense of belonging to a group and a desire to differentiate this 
group positively from other groups (Tajfel 1981). From this perspective, vot-
ers divide the world into an in-group (their own party) and an out-group 
(opposing party or parties). Such divisions into ‘us vs. them’ tend to trig-
ger both positive feelings towards the in-group and negative feelings to-
wards the out-group(s) (Tajfel 1981). As partisanship is an important social 
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identity to partisans, they tend to be less willing to interact with voters of 
the other party in close interpersonal relations, such as an in-law from the 
out-group (Iyengar et al. 2019).
Affective Polarization in Two-Party vs. Multiparty Systems
A key question that the comparative literature on affective polarization 
seeks to address is whether the levels of partisan affective polarization are 
higher in two-party systems (e.g., the United States) than in multiparty 
systems (e.g., several European countries). Differences in affective polar-
ization across party systems may stem from differences in partisan social 
identity, but as Aarøe and Petersen (2014) argue, people tend to be largely 
similar at the level of psychological predispositions (e.g., holding negative 
views against out-partisans). This would suggest that observed differences in 
levels of affective polarization largely stem from other variables, such as the 
current political environment in a country, where a less hostile environment 
between parties may result in lower levels of affective polarization (Gidron 
et al. 2019). However, differences may also arise due to how affective polar-
ization is measured and operationalized.
Much of the literature indicates that affective polarization is no higher 
in the United States than it is in countries with multiparty systems. For 
instance, comparative studies measuring affective polarization have reached 
this conclusion using trust games (Westwood et al. 2018) and voters’ feelings 
towards parties (e.g., Gidron et al. 2019; Reiljan 2020). However, comparing 
multiparty and two-party systems is not straightforward. Polarization relates 
to the affective distance between the in-party and out-party. As affective 
polarization in two-party systems concerns the extent to which one feels 
positively about one’s own party (the in-group) and negatively about the 
‘other’ party (the out-group), it is an intuitive concept. However, as Wagner 
(2020) argues, the task of measuring and theoretically understanding affec-
tive polarization in multiparty systems is complex because the ‘other’ party 
may refer to several other parties.
One solution is to conceptualize affective polarization in multiparty sys-
tems as the average distance between positive feelings towards the party for 
which one intends to vote (the in-party) and negative feelings towards all 
other parties (the out-parties). However, this conceptualization overlooks 
that voters in a multiparty system may feel close to more than one party 
(Garry 2007). Another solution is to restrict the analysis to voters of the 
two major parties (e.g., Iyengar et al. 2012; Gidron et al. 2019). However, 
this solution disregards that multiparty systems consist of several parties. 
Voters in multiparty systems are not likely to exclusively feel positively 
about partisans from one party and exclusively negative about all other 
partisans (Garry 2007; Wagner 2020). Thus, reducing the number of parties 
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likely also decreases the measured level of affective polarization in a mul-
tiparty system.
With this in mind, I focus on an alternative solution that views parti-
san affective polarization as affective distance from voters between blocs 
of multiple parties (Reiljan 2020; Wagner 2020). Party blocs can arise, for 
instance, when a coalition of parties forms government. Huddy et al. (2018) 
detect affective polarization between (and within) the government coalition 
bloc and the opposition bloc in Sweden.
Case Selection and Research Questions
According to Gidron et al.’s (2019) analyses of indices of affective polar-
ization towards parties, Norway stands out as the least likely European 
country with a multiparty system to show levels of affective polarization 
resembling those in the United States. Gidron and colleagues argue that 
the Scandinavian countries feature consensual institutions and promote 
power-sharing among parties, which might produce a less hostile political 
environment. Thus, by comparing the United States and Norway, I conduct 
a strong test of whether the levels of affective polarization are higher in the 
United States than in a European multiparty system. That said, the com-
parative literature on differences in levels of affective polarization between 
Norway and the United States has yielded conflicting results depending 
on the empirical strategy applied. Using the same data (the Comparative 
Study of Electoral Systems data) to focus on affect towards parties but a 
different analytic strategy, Wagner (2020) finds quite similar levels of af-
fective polarization between the two countries, while Gidron et al. (2019) 
find that Norway is statistically significantly less affectively polarized than 
the United States. Given these conflicting results and the fact that no pub-
lished study has compared affective polarization towards both parties and 
voters across party systems, I formulate research questions rather than for-
mal hypotheses.
RQ1a: To what extent are the levels of affective polarization towards voters different in the 
United States compared to Norway?
RQ1b: To what extent are the levels of affective polarization towards parties different in the 
United States compared to Norway?
While Druckman and Levendusky (2019) argue that affective polariza-
tion towards parties cannot necessarily indicate levels of affective polariza-
tion towards voters, it is reasonable to assume that affect towards parties is 
related to affect towards voters. However, we know less about the extent to 
which negative feelings towards out-parties move to the personal level in 
terms of negative feelings towards voters of out-parties.
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RQ2: To what extent does affective polarization towards parties reflect affective polariza-
tion towards voters?
Methods, Data, Measurement and Analysis
To measure affective polarization towards voters, I conduct a survey ex-
periment in Norway and the United States using the inter-party marriage 
measure of affective polarization – a less obtrusive measure that focuses on 
the extent to which voters feel discomfort or comfort with having an in-law 
who votes for an opposing party (Iyengar et al. 2019). I incorporate Klar 
et al.’s (2018) design suggestions to avoid conflating people’s dislike for the 
out-party and dislike for partisanship in general by randomly assigning a 
hypothetical in-law to talking often or rarely about politics.1. The design also 
accounts for Druckman and Levendusky’s (2019) argument about differ-
ences between elites and voters by specifying that the in-law is a party voter.
I conduct the exact same experiment in both countries, asking ‘How 
happy or unhappy would you feel if you had a son or daughter who married 
a person who votes for [|party] [|frequency] talks about politics?’ The treat-
ment ‘|party’ randomly varies between the two parties in the United States 
and between the nine parties in the Norwegian parliament. The treatment 
‘|frequency’ varies between ‘but who rarely’ and ‘and who often.’ I employ a 
seven-point scale ranging from ‘very unhappy’ to ‘very happy’ as the depen-
dent variable in both countries.
To measure affective polarization towards parties, I measure the extent 
to which respondents like each of the parties in the two countries using a 
seven-point scale ranging from ‘extremely dislike’ to ‘extremely like.’
Data and Sample
The Norwegian data (N = 1,350) derive from a probability-based online 
national survey conducted by the Norwegian Citizen Panel (NCP) in June 
2018. For details about response rates or other methodological matters, 
please see the NCP methodology report (Skjervheim & Høgestøl 2018).
The US data (N = 500) derive from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) 
in October 2018. Eligibility to take the survey was restricted to US-based 
MTurk workers, and participants were paid $0.36 for three minutes of their 
time. Participants were screened for answering time and randomly assigned 
to a CAPTCHA trial to enhance data quality. A common critique of MTurk 
samples is that although they are fairly diverse, they are not representative of 
the American population as a whole (Huff & Tingley 2015). Although studies 
have demonstrated the potential value of MTurk as an experimental source 
relative to probability-based US samples (Mullinix et al. 2015; Coppock 
et al. 2018), the use of MTurk can potentially cause biased estimates of the 
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treatment effects. This can hinder comparability between effects in the US 
and Norwegian samples, as the measured effects in the United States might 
differ from those in a representative sample of the population. To mitigate 
against biased estimates of the treatment effects and enhance comparability 
across samples, all analyses in the main text employ entropy balancing for 
the US data (Hainmueller 2012; for a similar approach, see Huff & Kertzer 
2018) and the survey weights provided by the NCP to reweight the data to 
more closely match demographic characteristics from the two national pop-
ulations. For all analyses presented in the main text, the conclusions remain 
the same regardless of whether weights are employed.
Analytic Strategy
I use three different approaches to explore affective polarization. For all 
approaches, I use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models and illus-
trate the effects as the predicted marginal mean effects on the dependent 
variables (i.e., happiness with in-law and difference in like/dislike scores for 
parties) with 95% confidence intervals.
To answer RQ1a, I focus on affective polarization towards voters by divid-
ing the Norwegian respondents into two groups: voters2. of the opposition 
bloc and voters of the coalition bloc (see Huddy et al. 2018 for a similar strat-
egy). The coalition bloc in Norway consists of (at the time) the two govern-
ment coalition parties (i.e., the Conservative Party and the Progress Party) 
and the two parties in a coalition agreement with the government coalition 
(the Liberal Party and the Christian Democratic Party). The opposition bloc 
consists of (at the time) the opposition parties (i.e., the Labour Party, the 
Socialist Left Party, the Red Party, the Green Party and the Center Party). 
This measure allows for comparing the difference between negative and 
positive affect towards the two blocs in Norway to the difference between 
negative and positive affect towards the two parties in the United States.
To answer RQ1b, I focus on affective polarization towards parties. In 
Norway, I again divide voters into a coalition bloc and an opposition bloc and 
use the like/dislike of parties’ measure to calculate3. the average difference 
in voters’ feelings towards their in-bloc and out-bloc. In the United States, I 
use the same measure to calculate the average difference in Democrats’ and 
Republicans’ feelings towards both parties.
To answer RQ2, I combine the measures of affective polarization towards 
parties and voters by matching each treatment party with the measure of 
the degree to which respondents like or dislike each treatment party.
Findings
Starting with the question of whether levels of affective polarization to-
wards voters are similar in the United States and Norway (RQ1a), the top 
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panels in Figure 1 show the results of the comparison of the two blocs in 
Norway (opposition vs. coalition) and Republicans and Democrats in the 
United States. The top left panel in Figure 1 shows the results by party bloc 
in Norway and by party in the United States. For both party blocs and par-
ties, we see a statistically significant difference between the in-party/bloc 
and out-party/bloc. The two top right panels in Figure 1 show the differences 
between Norway and the United States in terms of the average differences 
between respondents’ happiness with an in-group in-law and an out-group 
in-law. While the average distance between the in-group in-law and out-
group in-law is higher in Norway than in the United States, the gap between 
the two countries is not statistically significant (F(1) = 1.95, p > .1). It is im-
portant to note that while the wide confidence interval of the in-party mean 
for Republicans is largely due to the survey weights applied, the difference 
between the two countries remains statistically insignificant when analysing 
unweighted data as well.
The bottom panels in Figure 1 address the question of whether the lev-
els of affective polarization towards parties is similar in the United States 
and Norway (RQ1b). These panels show the difference in average feelings 
towards parties/blocs in both countries. The results in these bottom panels 
Figure 1. Comparing Affective Polarization towards Voters and Parties in Norway and the 
United States. Note: The upper panel shows the marginal mean effects of the party treatment 
by bloc/party on happiness with in-law in Norway and the United States, with higher numbers 
indicating more happiness. The lower panel shows the average difference between the like/
dislike scores for the in-party/bloc and out-party/bloc by country. Higher numbers indicate a 
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in Figure 1 indicate that affective polarization towards parties is statistically 
significantly higher in the United States than in Norway (p < .001). Note 
that I find a similar statistically significant difference using Gidron et al.’s 
(2019) suggested approach – comparing the feelings of voters of the two 
largest parties for the other party (t(923) = −2.5, p < .01).
Finally, addressing the question of the extent to which affective polariza-
tion towards parties reflects affective polarization towards voters (RQ2), I 
correlate the extent to which respondents like or dislike the treatment party 
and respondents’ happiness with the in-law. The overall correlation between 
liking/disliking the treatment parties and attitude towards the in-law is mod-
erate in both countries (overall: r = .59, p < .001, US: r = .6, p < .001; NO: 
r = .58, p < .001). Figure 2 further breaks down these correlations by show-
ing the treatment effects of an in-law from either an out-party/bloc or an 
in-party/bloc (separated into four groups – the opposition left and centre 
and the coalition centre and right). In the Appendix S1, I include analy-
ses of liking/disliking each of the treatment parties. Figure 2 indicates that 
there are almost identical patterns in the two countries in terms of negative 
affect towards an out-group in-law and positive affect towards an in-group 
in-law. Yet Figure 2 also reveals an important nuance. For all parties except 
the centre parties in the coalition (the Christian Democratic Party and the 
Liberal Party) in Norway, we see a cleaved interaction effect between liking/ 
disliking the parties by treatment party bloc (i.e., opposition or coalition). 
Figure 2. Interaction Effects between Party Treatment and Like/Dislike of Parties/Bloc on 
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The low levels of affective polarization towards these two parties suggest 
that not all parties in multiparty systems inspire negative or positive affect 
towards out-party voters and in-party voters to the same extent. Note 
that these low levels of affective polarization are not necessarily observed 
because the two parties are centre parties, as we see a cleaved interaction 
effect for the centre parties in the opposition.
While this provides evidence that the centre parties in the coalition bloc 
are less likely be affectively polarized, thus possibly influencing the overall 
measured level of affective polarization in Norway, it is important to note 
that the results reported in the top panels of Figure 1 remain substantively 
similar if I exclude the Liberal Party and Christian Democratic Party treat-
ments from the analysis. Note that the difference between the United States 
and Norway is also statistically insignificant (F(1) = 0.46, p > .1) if I instead 
use the like/dislike measure to calculate differences in affective polariza-
tion towards voters (also when excluding the Liberal Party and Christian 
Democratic Party treatments from the analysis).
Conclusion
In this article, I move the growing body of literature comparing affective 
polarization across party systems one step further. Through a comparison 
between the United States and Norway, I contribute the first cross-country 
comparison of affective polarization towards both voters and parties to take 
into account that multiparty systems have numerous parties.
The findings suggest that the differences in levels of partisan affective 
polarization between the United States and Norway are indistinguishable 
from chance when using a direct measure of affective polarization towards 
voters. However, when using a measure of affective polarization towards 
parties that has been applied frequently in comparative studies (e.g., Gidron 
et al. 2019; Reiljan 2020; Wagner 2020), I find, in line with Gidron et al.’s 
(2019) results, that the US respondents are statistically significantly more 
affectively polarized than Norwegians. This is an important addition to 
existing evidence concerning affective polarization across systems because 
these results provide empirical support for Druckman and Levendusky’s 
(2019) argument that evidence of affect towards parties cannot necessarily 
be generalized to affect towards voters. Thus, the findings contribute to our 
theoretical understanding of affective polarization by demonstrating that 
the conclusions one draws about cross-country differences may depend on 
how affective polarization is measured and operationalized. That said, this 
does not mean that affect towards parties and towards the parties’ voters are 
unrelated, as my results indicate a moderate positive correlation between 
party-related affect and voter-related affect in both countries. While these 
are two different phenomena, citizens’ negative feelings towards out-parties 
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do move to some extent to the personal level in terms of negative feelings 
towards the voters of these out-parties.
The similarity between affect towards voters in Norway and the United 
States may also speak to the potential mechanisms that shape affective 
polarization. Gidron et al. (2019) suggest that the Scandinavian countries 
might have lower levels of affective polarization due to less hostile politi-
cal environments and low levels of economic inequality. While neither their 
study nor this study could explore the causal mechanisms behind differ-
ences in affective polarization across countries, the results of the present 
study indicate that the differences in hostility in political environments and 
levels of economic inequality seem to be less important in the rise of affec-
tive polarization towards voters.
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NOTES
1. The frequency of talk treatments has no influence on the results presented in the main 
text. See the Appendix S1 for more details on these results. 
2. To measure party preference in Norway, I ask, ‘If a national election was held tomorrow, 
which party would you vote for?’ In the United States, I ask, ‘Generally speaking, do you 
usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, or an independent?’ Note that 
I do not collect information about Republican and Democrat leaners, and the measure 
in the United States captures partisan identity, while the measure in Norway captures 
voting intention. 
3. Inspired by Reiljan’s (2019) and Wagner’s (2020) approach, I use the like/dislike mea-
sure to calculate the average difference in voters’ feelings towards their in-bloc and 
out-bloc. 
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